Tax reform with endogenous borrowing limits and incomplete asset markets by Ábrahám, Árpád & Cárceles Poveda, Eva
ADEMU WORKING PAPER SERIES 
Tax reform with endogenous borrowing limits 
and incomplete asset markets 
Árpád Abrahám† 
Eva Carceles Poveda‡
June 2016 
WP 2016/013 
www.ademu-project.eu/publications/working-papers 
Abstract 
This paper studies different income tax reforms in an infinite horizon economy with a progressive 
labor income tax code, incomplete markets and endogenous borrowing constraints on asset 
holdings. The endogenous limits are determined at the level at which households are indifferent 
between defaulting and paying back their un-secured debt. The reforms we study area all revenue 
neutral and they eliminate capital income taxes but they differ in the changes to the labor income 
tax code. Our results illustrate that a successful reform has to combine the elimination of capital 
income taxes with an increase in the progressivity of the labor income tax code. On the one hand, 
this reduces the disposable income of the rich, leading to lower savings and to a lower aggregate 
capital. On the other hand, it allows the middle income households to save more at a higher after 
tax interest rate and the low income households to borrow more on a lower interest rate. This 
increases welfare both in the long run and throughout the transition. The welfare gains are hence 
obtained not through more capital accumulation but by reducing wealth and consequently 
consumption inequality. 
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1. Introduction
This paper studies di¤erent tax reforms in an innite horizon incomplete markets model with
production where borrowing constraints on asset holdings are endogenous. In particular,
we study the desirability of the revenue neutral elimination of capital income taxes. In
our economy, capital income taxes discourage capital accumulation and in principle their
elimination can lead to long run welfare gains. However, the only way to recover the lost
revenue for the government is to adjust the labor income tax system. We use a exible non-
linear labor tax function which approximates well the current U.S. tax system. We study
what changes in labor income taxes can lead to an increase in aggregate welfare and can gain
political support.
In order to be able to study the welfare e¤ect of a realistic tax reform, we need to have a
model with a realistic wealth distribution. The fact that there is a signicant proportion of
individuals in debt in the data implies that a realistic model of incomplete markets should also
be able to generate enough borrowing. Clearly, these two aspects are interrelated through
the borrowing constraints, since they are one of the key determinants of the (equilibrium)
level of debt and in general of the wealth distribution in these type of economies. In the
present paper, we determine these constraints endogenously and we explicitly take this into
account by calibrating the model so that the distribution of assets and the amount of debt
matches the one in the data.
To endogeneize the borrowing limits, we introduce the possibility of default on nancial
liabilities. In particular, we assume that households can break their trading contracts every
period. In this case, individual liabilities are forgiven, assets are seized, and agents are
excluded from future asset trade forever. The endogenous trading limits are then set at the
level at which households are indi¤erent between honoring their debt and defaulting.
An appealing property of endogeneizing the borrowing limits becomes more apparent
when we consider policy applications such as the reforms we study. In a framework in which
the equilibrium allocations exhibit imperfect risk sharing, changes in economic policy typi-
cally a¤ect the wealth distribution. In the presence of limited commitment, these changes
also a¤ect the relative value of default and consequently the endogenous borrowing con-
straints. This is particularly important in models with capital accumulation, potentially,
generating sizeable general equilibrium e¤ects that interact with the borrowing limits. For
this reason, in order to isolate the e¤ect of the endogenously responding borrowing limits,
we also study the case when the limits are kept unchanged after the reform.
Using the calibrated economy, we study the e¤ect of di¤erent tax reforms quantitatively
both in the long run (comparing steady states) and in the short run by analyzing the tran-
sitional dynamics. Our main result is that the only reform which has a chance to increase
aggregate welfare both in the short and long run is a reform in which the elimination of
capital income taxes an the subsequent increase in average labor income taxes are accom-
panied by an increase in the progressivity of the labor income tax system. The key is that
reforms which nance the decrease in capital taxes only through an increase in the average
tax rate, cannot be successful, as they put too high burden on the asset poor individuals.
These agents benet little from the higher (after tax) interest rate but loose considerably
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because of higher labor taxes and a lower disposable income. A reform that increases the
progressivity of the labor income tax code can therefore gain political support and increase
aggregate welfare, although it taxes high income people more heavily and for that reason
leads to a lower aggregate capital eventually. This implies that the reform increases welfare
by decreasing inequality. In fact, the elimination of capital taxes increases the savings of the
low income households, while this is more than o¤set by the reduction of asset accumulation
of the high income individuals.
When the borrowing limits are endogenous, it is important to note that the progressive
reform makes default more attractive for borrowers, as interest rates become higher. This
leads to a tighter borrowing limit in the long run. In turn, this implies that the poorest
households in the new steady state are richer than in the original one, an e¤ect that con-
tributes to a higher long run aggregate welfare. Note, however, that these last e¤ect also
shows that it is not appropriate to draw welfare calculations based upon comparing only
steady states. Namely, tighter borrowing limits may hurt agents signicantly in the short
run, as they limit consumption smoothing potentially decreasing their welfare. However, the
computed transition dynamics shows that this is not the case in our economy because the
borrowing limits do not get tighter at impact but instead become slightly looser. Then they
become considerably tighter very gradually over a long period of time. This implies that the
reform does not immediately limit consumption smoothing for the constrained agents and
it implies that aggregate welfare increases signicantly not only in the long run, but also
when the transition is taken into account. The reform also gains an overwhelming political
support. It is supported by the asset rich, who benet from the increase in the after-tax
interest rate. Further, it is also supported by the income poor, whose tax burden did not
change signicantly, while they now face lower borrowing interest rates (in the short run)
and higher after tax saving interest rates.
Similarly, the linear reform makes default less attractive for borrowers due to a lower
interest rate. This leads to a looser borrowing limit in the long run and it implies that the
poorest households are poorer than in the original steady state, contributing to a lower long
run aggregate welfare. As in the previous reform, looser borrowing limits lead also to more
consumption smoothing in the short run and could potentially overturn this e¤ect during
the transition. The transition, nevertheless, does not modify this picture too much. It is
true that borrowing constrained agents have some additional welfare gains because of the
relaxation of the borrowing constraints, but most of the low income agents would be still
against the reform because it implies a signicantly higher tax burden. Overall, only 25
percent will support this reform and the reform would still lead to a modest welfare loss
after the transition is taken into account.
Finally, we also compare the welfare changes with the interim case in which the endoge-
nous borrowing limits are kept at their pre-reform level. Again, we nd that our qualitative
ndings do not change if we ignore the e¤ect on the limits. In the linear reform, however,
the immediate welfare losses would have been more severe if the limits did not adjust to
the policy change. Similarly, the welfare gains from the progressive reform would have been
exaggerated if the e¤ect of the limits was not taken into account. Even though this may
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sound counter-intuitive, as the limits get looser at impact, agents are forward-looking and
take into account that the limits are getting signicantly tighter over time.
Our work builds a bridge between two important strands of literature. First, it con-
tributes to an increasingly growing literature in which a number of authors have introduced
limited enforceability of risk-sharing contracts in models with complete markets, implicitly
resulting in agent and state specic trading constraints. Among others, Kehoe and Levine
(1993), Alvarez and Jermann (2000, 2001) and Krueger and Perri (2005) introduce these type
of limits in exchange economies, whereas Kehoe and Perri (2002, 2004) study a production
economy where investors are interpreted as countries. Since the lack of commitment leads to
equilibrium allocations that exhibit imperfect risk sharing, these models are labelled endoge-
nous incomplete market economies. However, the imperfect risk sharing result may not be
robust to the introduction of capital accumulation in closed economy models. For example,
Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2008) show that the equilibrium of a two agent model with
endogenous production exhibits full risk sharing in the long run for standard parameteriza-
tions. Further, Krueger and Perri (2006) show that a model with a continuum of agents and
endogenous incomplete markets is not able to account for the increase in US consumption
inequality due to the fact that there is too much risk sharing.1 Since the implications of
models with full or close to full risk sharing are clearly at odds with the data, this provides
a strong motivation to study limited commitment in economies with incomplete markets,
where risk sharing is always limited. While the number of assets traded is still exogenous in
this case, the presence of limited commitment endogenizes the amount that households can
borrow. In this sense, the degree of market incompleteness becomes partially endogenous,
as in the present paper.
Second, our work is related to the recent literature studying the welfare e¤ects of capital
income taxation in a context with heterogeneous agents. For example, Aiyagari (1995) studies
the optimal capital income tax in a model with incomplete markets and no borrowing. In
contrast to the seminal papers of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), who show that the
optimal long run capital income tax is zero for a wide class of innite horizon models with
complete markets, the author shows that the optimal long run capital income tax is always
strictly positive. Further, in a model with no borrowing and a more realistic calibration,
Domeij and Heathcote (2004) nd that eliminating capital income taxes in a setting with no
borrowing and at tax rates may be welfare improving in the long run, while it decreases
welfare in the short run. In contrast, Davila et. al. nd that the constrained e¢ cient level
of capital is much higher than the competitive equilibrium one in economies similar to us
where uninsurable shocks labor income shocks. They allow fully exible taxes and transfers.
Nevertheless, we conrm the results of Domeij and Heathcote (2004) in the sense, that in
our most preferred reform aggregate capital is lower than in the benchmark with our more
exible tax system. However we also show that the elimination of capital taxes can be welfare
improving if it is accompanied by the increase of progressivity of the labor income tax system.
Conesa and Krueger (2006, 2009) study tax reforms in the presence of a progressive labor
1Cordoba [12] also obtains full risk sharing in a production economy with a continuum of agents, complete
markets and collateral constraints.
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income tax code in a setting with overlapping generations and no borrowing. In contrast,
our setting is an innite horizon economy and it allows for endogenous borrowing limits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model
with incomplete markets. Section 3 presents the calibration and numerical solution of the
benchmark model and Section 4 analyzes the welfare implications of a tax reform in the long
run and along the transition. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2. The Model
We consider an innite horizon economy with endogenous production, idiosyncratic labor
productivity shocks and sequential asset trade. The economy is populated by a government,
a representative rm and a continuum (measure 1) of innitely lived households that are
indexed by i 2 I.
Households. Households are endowed with one unit of time and they can use it to
either supply labor to the rm or to consume leisure. Preferences over sequences of con-
sumption ci  fcitg1t=0 and leisure 1  li  f1  litg1t=0 are assumed to be time separable:
U(ci; 1  li) = E0
1X
t=0
tu (cit; 1  lit) ; (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor and E0 denotes the expectation conditional
on information at date t = 0. We assume that the period utility function u : R2+ ! R is
strictly increasing and continuously di¤erentiable in both arguments.
Each period, household i 2 I receives a stochastic labour productivity shock i. This
shock is is i.i.d. across households and it follows a Markov process with transition matrix
(0j) and S possible values that are assumed to be strictly positive. A household working
lit hours has a pre-tax labor income of wtlitit, where wt is the wage rate per e¢ ciency unit of
labor. Labor income taxes are assumed to be progressive and they are set by the government
according to the function T lt (wtlitit).
To insure against their idiosyncratic labor income risk, we assume that households can
trade (borrow or save) in one riskless asset, whose interest income is subject to a proportional
capital income tax k(kit), where kit represents the beginning of period individual asset
holdings. The after-tax gross return is therefore equal to 1 + rt (1  k(kit)). We assume
that only savers pay taxes on interest income. Given this, capital income taxes depend on
the level of assets in the following way:
k(kit) =
(
 k if kit  0
0 if kit < 0
:
The householdsbudget constraint can be expressed as:
cit + kit+1 = wtlitit   T lt (wtlitit) + (1 + rt (1  k(kit))) kit: (2)
At each date, household i 2 I also faces a possibly endogenous and state-dependent trade
restriction on the end of period asset holdings:
kit+1  it
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Throughout the paper, we assume that households cannot commit on the trading con-
tracts and we determine the borrowing constraint it endogenously at the level that prevents
default in equilibrium. In case of default, we assume that individual liabilities are forgiven
and households are excluded from future asset trade. Households can continue supplying
labor to the rm and this implies that their only source of income from the default period
is their labor income. Following Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2006), we also assume that
there is an additional penalty  that reduces after-tax labour income by (1  ) after default.
This penalty can be interpreted as a reduced form for di¤erent monetary and non monetary
costs of defaulting, such as the fraction of income that is garnished by creditors, the utility
(stigma), the xed monetary costs of ling, and the increased cost of consumption.2
Production. At each date, the representative rm uses capital Kt 2 R+ and labor
Lt 2 (0; 1) to produce a single good yt 2 R+ with the constant returns to scale technology:
yt = Af(Kt; Lt); (3)
where A is a technology parameter that represents total factor productivity. The production
function f (; ) : R2+ ! R+ is assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable on the interior of
its domain, strictly increasing, strictly concave in K and homogeneous of degree one in K
and L. Capital depreciates at the rate  and we denote total output including undepreciated
capital by:
F (Kt; Lt) = Af(Kt; Lt) + (1  )Kt: (4)
Each period, the rm rents capital and labor to maximize period prots and, in equilib-
rium, the two factor prices are given by:
wt = fL(Kt; Lt) (5)
rt = fK(Kt; Lt)  : (6)
Government and Market Clearing. At each period t, the government consumes the
amount Gt and it taxes individual labor income according to T lt () and individual capital
income at the rate k. The government is assumed to have a balanced budget. Let 	t(; k)
be the joint distribution over individual shocks and asset holdings (; k) and let kt+1(; k; 	),
lt(; k; 	) and ct(; k; 	) be the individual asset, labor and consumption choices. The gov-
ernment budget constraint is equal to:
Gt =
Z
;k
T lt [wtlt(; k; 	)] d	t(; k) + rt k
bKt;
where bKt is the sum of positive asset holdings. Further, the labor and asset market clearing
conditions require that the sum of individual labor supply times the productivity shock is
2This punishment for default resembles the bankruptcy procedures under Chapter 7. Under this procedure,
households are seized from any positive asset holdings but can keep at least part of their labour income.
Whereas they are allowed to borrow after some periods, this becomes considerably more di¢ cult and costly
because their credit rating deteriorates signicantly.
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equal to the total labor supply, while the sum of individual capital holdings are equal to the
aggregate capital stock:
Kt+1 =
Z
;k
kt+1(; k; 	)d	t(; k) and Lt =
Z
;k
lt (; k; 	) d	t(; k)
Finally, the goods market clearing condition requires that the sum of investment and
aggregate consumption, including household and government consumption, is equal to the
aggregate output:
Kt+1 +
Z
;k
ct(; k; 	)d	t(; k) +Gt = F (Kt; Lt)
Recursive Competitive Equilibrium. In the present framework, the aggregate state
of the economy is given by the joint distribution 	 of consumers over individual capital
holdings k and idiosyncratic productivity status . Further, households perceive that 	
evolves according to:
	0 =  [	];
where   represents the transition function from the current aggregate state into tomorrows
wealth-productivity distribution. Since the individual state vector includes the individual
labour productivity and asset holdings (; k), the relevant state variables for a household are
summarized by the vector (; k; 	).
Using this notation, the outside option or autarky value V of a household with income
shock  can be expressed recursively as:
V (; 	) = u(w(	)l  T l	 (w(	)l; 	) (1  )) + 
X
0
(0j)V (0;  [	]): (7)
Equation (7) reects that the autarky value is a function of the wealth-productivity dis-
tribution. Note that this is in contrast with some of the literature with complete markets
and no commitment, where V is exogenous (see e.g. Alvarez and Jermann (2000, 2001)). As
we will see later, this is due to the fact that the distribution determines aggregate capital
accumulation, which in turn determines future wages and therefore the future value of nan-
cial autarky. On the other hand, since individual liabilities are forgiven upon default, the
autarky value is not a function of the individual capital holdings. Note also that the expres-
sion in (7) implicitly assumes that the aggregate state of the economy follows the same law
of motion  [	] if one of the agents defaults. This is correct in the presence of a continuum of
agents, since an individual deviation does not inuence the aggregate variables and no one
defaults in equilibrium. Note that clearing the government budget constraint requires that
the labour tax function T l(y; 	) depends also on the distribution.
We are now ready to dene the recursive competitive equilibrium. Note, that factor
prices only depend on the aggregate production factors (capital and labor) and we therefore
write w(	) = w (K;L) and r(	) = r (K;L) in what follows.
Denition 2.1: Given a transition matrix  and some initial distribution of shocks
0  (i0)i2I and asset holdings k0  (ki0)i2I , a recursive competitive equilibrium relative
to the capital income tax rate k, the labor income tax function T l (; 	) : R+ ! R1+ and
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government consumption G, is dened by borrowing limits (; 	); a law of motion  , a
vector of factor prices (r; w) = (r (K;L) ; w (K;L)), value functions W = W (; k; 	) and
V = V (; 	), and individual policy functions (c; l; k0) = (c(; k; 	); l(; k; 	); k(; k; 	)) such
that:
(i) Utility Maximization: For each i 2 I, W and (c; l; k0) solve the following problem given
k0, 0, ;  ; T l and k and (r; w):
W (; k; 	) = max
c;k0;l
(
u(c; 1  l) + 
X
0
(0j)W (0; k0; 	0)
)
(8)
s.t. c+ k0 = w(K;L)l  T l (w(K;L)l; 	) + (1 + r(K;L) (1  k (k))) k
	0 =  [	]
c  0, 0  l  1
k0  (; 	):
(ii) Prot Maximization: Factor prices satisfy the rms optimality conditions, i.e., w(K;L) =
fL(K;L) and r(K;L) = fK(K;L)  .
(iii) Balanced Budget: The government budget constraint is satised, i.e.,
G =
Z
;k
T l (w (K;L) l(; k; 	); 	) d	(; k) + r (K;L)  k bK, where
bK = Z
;k0
k(; k; 	)d	(; k)
is the sum of capital holdings of those who hold non-negative assets.
(iv) Market Clearing:
K 0 =
Z
;k
k(; k; 	)d	(; k) and L =
Z
;k
l(; k; 	)d	(; k)
Z
;k
c(; k; 	)d	(; k) +K 0 +G = F (K;L)
(v) Consistency:   is consistent with the agentsoptimal decisions, in the sense that it is
generated by the optimal decision rules and by the law of motion of the shock.
(vi) No default: k(; 	) is the debt level such that individuals are indi¤erent between trading
and going into autarky, i.e.,
k(; 	) = fk : W (; k; 	) = V (; 	)g : (9)
where
V (; 	) = max
c;l
(
u(c; 1  l) + 
X
0
(0j)V (0; 	0)
)
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s.t. c =

w(K;L)l  T l (w (K;L) l; 	)

(1  )
	0 =  [	]
c  0, 0  l  1
(; 	)  sup
0:(0j)>0

k
 
0;  [	]
	
: (10)
Several remarks are worth noting. First, as reected in conditions (i) and (vi), households
are only allowed to hold levels of individual capital that are above a state-dependent lower
bound for each continuation state with positive probability next period. This implies that
the e¤ective limit on capital holdings (; 	) faced by a household is the tightest among
these state-dependent lower bounds. 3
Second, the denition of the state-dependent lower bounds in (9) implies that we can
think about k(; 	) as a state-dependent default threshold, since it represents the level of
capital holdings such that households are indi¤erent between defaulting and paying back
their debt. Clearly, condition (vi) implies that we only consider equilibria where the trading
limits are such that default is not possible. Whereas there are many borrowing limits that
prevent default in equilibrium, we consider the loosest possible ones of such limits. In other
words, we study the economy with limits that are not too tight, in the sense that they satisfy
(9) and (10).
As shown by Ábrahám, Á. and E. Cárceles-Poveda (2009), there exists a unique lower
bound k(; 	) satisfying equation (9). Note that the existence of the default thresholds is
a consequence of the fact that V (; 	) is nite, while W (; k; 	) goes to minus innity as
k goes to the natural borrowing limit. In addition, uniqueness simply follows from the fact
that V (; 	) does not depend on k while W (; k; 	) is strictly increasing in k. An important
implication of uniqueness is the fact that the value of staying in the trading arrangement is
always higher than the autarky value if the capital holdings are above the default threshold,
that is,
W (; k; 	)  V (; 	) = W (; k; 	) for 8k  k(; 	):
The fact that the thresholds are nite is a consequence of the fact that V (; 	) is nite.
Finally, the equilibrium default thresholds and e¤ective limits have to be clearly non-positive.
Intuitively, note that agents would not default with a positive level of asset holdings, since
they could then a¤ord a higher current consumption than in autarky and at least as high of
a life-time utility as in autarky from next period on by paying back their debt.
An important property of the endogenous borrowing thresholds k(; 	) will be their
dependence on the labor income shock. Ábrahám and Carceles-Poveda (2009) show theoret-
ically that if households do not derive utility from leisure and labor taxes are at, the higher
is the productivity shock of an agent, the looser are the default thresholds, i.e. @k(;	)@  0
under i.i.d. shocks. As our numerical results will show, this property is robust to the pres-
ence of a labor-leisure decision and progressive labor income taxes. Given that the ability
3 If the probability of all future shock realizations is strictly positive for any given shock, the e¤ective limit
faced by the households will not be a function of the current shock, since the trading restriction has to be
satised for all possible continuation states. This will not be the case, however, in our calibrated example.
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to borrow is a positive function of income in the data, this result is a desirable property
of the present setting. Of course, a key aspect for obtaining this result is that markets are
e¤ectively incomplete.
Finally, it is important to note that the default thresholds are very closely related to
the endogenous borrowing limits on Arrow securities that are dened in the literature with
complete markets and limited commitment. Among others, Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and
Ábrahám and Carceles (2007a) dene these limits in endowment and production economies,
respectively.
3. Calibration and Solution Method
This section discusses the calibration for the benchmark economy as well as the solution
method. Next, we study the properties of the endogenous borrowing limits, particularly the
relationship between these limits and income.
3.1. Calibration. One of the main objectives of the calibration is that the model steady
state matches the earnings and wealth distribution in the US. In addition, we target several
aggregate statistics, such as the interest rate, the labor share and the investment and capital
to output ratios in the US data.
The time period is assumed to be one year. For preferences, we assume the Cobb Dou-
glas function u (c; 1  l) = [c
(1 l)1 ]1 
1  , where  determines the relative importance of
consumption and  is the level of risk aversion. We set  = 4 and calibrate  to match 0.42,
the average labor supply of men in the Time Use Surveys of 2003-2005. This target was
obtained by noting that men work 40.8 hours on average per week, while their disposable
time is 97 hours after deducting sleep and personal care(0:42 = 40:8=97).
The production function is Cobb Douglas, f (K;L) = AKL1 , where  = 0:36 is
chosen to match the labor share of 0:64 in the US data and the technology parameter A is
normalized so that output is equal to one in the steady state of the deterministic economy.
The depreciation rate is set to  = 0:08 to match the annual investment to capital ratio in
the US and the discount factor  = 0:91 is set to match a capital to output ratio of around
3, which is the value reported for the US in Cooley and Prescott (1995). This generates an
interest rate of around 4%.
We want the income tax code to be a good approximation of the one in US. To achieve
this, we assume a at capital income tax of k = 0:4, which is very close to the value found
by Domeij and Heathcote (2004) using the method of Mendoza et. al (1994). Further, we
assume progressive labor income taxes. In particular, if y = wl represents taxable income,
the labor income tax is represented by the function:
T l (y ) = {0

y  
 
y {1p + {2
  1{1 
where ({0;{1;{2) are parameters. This functional form was originally proposed by Gouveia
and Strauss (1994), who estimated the function for the US income tax code. Subsequently, it
has been analyzed by several authors such as Castaneda et al (1999), Smyth(2005), Conesa
and Krueger (2006,2008) and Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2008). Note that, in the previous
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function, the average labor income tax rate is governed by the parameter {0, while {1 governs
the degree of progressivity. In particular, when {1 ! 0, the system becomes a at tax, while
{1 > 0 and {1 < 0 imply that the tax system is progressive and regressive respectively. To
get further insights of the e¤ects of possible tax reforms on labor income taxes, the following
gure depicts the e¤ects of changes in parameters {0 and {1 on (average) tax rates.
Figure 1: E¤ects of Changes in {0 and {1 on Labor Taxes
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The left panel of the gure depicts the e¤ects of the average tax rate parameter {0 for
low, medium and high income individuals. As we see, the increase in {0 leads to higher
labor income taxes for all the income groups, but the increase is steeper for higher income
individuals due to the fact that the labor tax system is progressive. The right panel of
the picture depicts the e¤ects of an increase in the progressivity parameter {1 for the same
individuals. As we see, an increase in this parameter leads to a dramatic reduction in
labor taxes for lower income individuals, while the impact is much smaller for the relatively
income rich. Later on, we will study the e¤ects of particular changes in these two parameters.
Gouveia and Strauss estimated this tax function for the US and they nd that {0 = 0:258
and {1 = 0:768. In the benchmark version of the model, we maintain these values and we
calibrate {2 to ensure government budget balance, with a target government to output ratio
of GY = 0:17. The government to output ratio is kept constant across all our experiments.
Table 1 describes the earnings process, which is a seven state Markov chain. The table
displays the shock values, the stationary distribution and the transition matrix. The process,
which is similar to the ones used by Diaz et. al (2003) and Davila et. al (2007), and the
default penalty of  = 0:145 are calibrated to match the number of people in debt as well as
a realistic income and wealth distribution in the benchmark steady state. In particular, the
Gini coe¢ cient for earnings is equal to 0.58, which is very close to the Gini of 0.6 in the US
data, and we target the percentage of people in debt and the total nancial assets held by
the lowest and highest quintiles of the US wealth distribution.4
4As discussed in Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2006), bankruptcy lers face several types of punishment.
Apart from the fact that lers cannot save or borrow, a fraction of earnings is garnished by creditors in the
three year period of ling. In addition, there are utility (stigma) and xed monetary costs of ling that imply
that a fraction of consumption may be lost. To match key observations regarding the evolution of bankruptcy
lings in the last decades, the authors choose a garnishment rate of 0.319 and set the other costs to zero.
Given this  = 0:145 does not seem to be excessively high.
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Table 1: Earnings Process
 =
h
0:1018 0:2192 0:5817 1:3045 2:9057 8:9879 16:0170
i
 =
h
0.0996 0.2256 0.4755 0.1092 0.0545 0.0294 0.0062
i
 (0j) =
2666666666664
0.9400 0.0213 0.0387 0 0 0 0
0.0265 0.8500 0.1235 0 0 0 0
0 0.0667 0:9180 0:0153 0 0 0
0 0 0:0666 0:8669 0:0665 0 0
0 0 0 0.1334 0.8000 0:0666 0
0 0 0 0 0:1235 0:8320 0:0445
0 0 0 0 0 0:2113 0:7887
3777777777775
Table 2 contains information about the wealth distribution in our benchmark model
and in the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances. Since the present paper is about unsecured
credit, we have tried to match some key moments of the distribution of net nancial assets.
In contrast, most of the macroeconomic literature focuses on the wealth distribution based
on net worth, dened as the di¤erence between total assets and total liabilities. When
calculating net nancial assets, we exclude the value of residential property, vehicles and
direct business ownership from the assets, and the value of secured debt due to mortgages and
vehicle loans from the liabilities. This level of assets represents better the amount of liquid
assets that households can use to smooth out income shocks. Moreover, both residential
properties and vehicles can be seen as durable consumption as much as investment.
As we see in the Table, according to the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, the lowest
quintile of the wealth distribution, as measured by net nancial assets, held -1.55% of total
nancial wealth, whereas 91.19 percent was held by the highest quintile. Our model matches
this aspect of the distribution very well, since the assets held by the lowest and highest
quintiles in the model are -1.56 and 90.35 respectively. Further, we also match reasonably
well the asset holdings of the three medium quintiles in spite of the fact that they are not
targeted. We also target and match well the proportion of the population in debt in the data:
24.31% (including the individuals with zero net nancial assets). In this respect, our model
is more reasonable than alternative models studying tax reforms in a similar framework, such
as Aiyagari (1995) and Domeij and Heathcote (2004), who assume no borrowing and thus
cannot capture the e¤ect of a reform on the substantial percentage of people in debt.
Table 2: The Wealth Distribution in the Benchmark Model and in the Data
Quintiles In debt
Economy Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 %
USA (net nancial assets) -1.55 0.09 1.61 8.66 91.19 24.40
Benchmark (pre-reform) -1.56 0.68 2.65 7.86 90.35 22.92
Gini of Earnings US: 0.6 Benchmark: 0.58
3.2. Solution Method. To nd the solution, we use a policy function iteration algorithm
that is described in detail in the Appendix. Solving the stationary distribution of the model
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with endogenous trading limits involves several computational di¢ culties. First, our state
space is endogenous, a problem that we address by incorporating an additional xed point
problem to nd the state-dependent limits on the individual capital holdings. This also
implies that our policy functions have to be calculated over a non-rectangular grid. Further,
given that the limits in our model are endogenously determined at the level where the value
function from staying in the contract is at least as large as the autarky value, it becomes
clear that a good approximation of the value functions close to the limits is needed to obtain
reliable results. To address this issue, we use a relatively high number of grid points, we
interpolate the policy and value functions over this grid and we allow the limits to take
values between grid points as well. In order to speed up the solution procedure, we update
the interest rate and the borrowing limits simultaneously.
In order to evaluate the welfare e¤ect of tax reforms, we have also computed the transition
of our economy between stationary distributions due to changes in the tax code. The extra
di¢ culty of this exercise is that not only factor prices (due to the accumulation of aggregate
capital), the distribution of individuals over asset holdings and labor income change during
the transition, but also the endogenous borrowing constraints. We have performed this
exercise in two steps. First, we assume that the limits jump immediately to the levels of
the second steady state, and compute the transition dynamics for all the other aggregate
variables (factor prices and the distribution). Then, using the solution of the rst step, we
adjust the limits and the rest of the aggregate variables such that all the requirements of the
competitive equilibrium (including the denition of the endogenous limits) are satised. The
rationale behind this two-step procedure is that, as we will see later, the limits do not a¤ect
the transition of the aggregate variables to a large extent. So, in the second step, there are
only small adjustments to be made with respect to the time path of the prices.
3.3. Endogenous Limits in the Benchmark Economy.
Figure 2: Endogenous Limits in the Benchmark Economy
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The endogenous limits in the benchmark economy are displayed in Figure 2. The left
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panel of the gure shows the level of the endogenous borrowing limits as a function of income,
while the right panel plots the same variable from empirical data.
Our data source is the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances. We only consider heads of
households that are working full time and report a positive labour income and credit card
limit. Our income measure is the annual labor income of the heads of households. Our income
data is constructed using survey questions regarding earnings and labor supply (number of
weeks worked per year).5 As to the borrowing limits, the best available information is based
on a question that asks the heads of households how much they can borrow on all their credit
card accounts.
The left panel of Figure 1 depicts the borrowing limits as a function of labor income.
Further, the right panel plots the borrowing limits as a proportion of labor income against
labor income. The solid lines display data using deciles of the income distribution, taking
averages within a decile. The dashed lines are the predicted borrowing limits from a regres-
sion where a third order polynomial of income, together with age, gender and education, are
used to explain the limit. The gures show the predicted limits for men with the average
age and educational level of the sample.
Note that the endogenous limits exhibit a similar behavior to the one in the data. In
particular, they get looser with income. These ndings conrm that the results in Ábrahám,
Á. and E. Cárceles-Poveda (2009) are robust to the presence of endogenous labor supply and
progressive labor income taxes. There, we also give further intuition behind this result.
4. Welfare Effects of Tax Reforms
This section analyzes the welfare implications of a revenue neutral tax reform that eliminates
capital income taxes at the expense of higher labor income taxes. We study two di¤erent
reforms. In the rst, the government replaces the loss of capital income tax revenue by
increasing {0 in the labor income tax function. Note that this implies a higher average tax
rate for all income levels. We label this reform as linear. In the second, the elimination of
capital income taxes is accompanied by an increase in the progressivity of the labor income
tax system. This is achieved by increasing {1 in the labor income tax function. Further,
government budget balance also requires a higher average tax rate (through an increase in {0)
than in the pre-reform steady state. We label this reform as progressive. Since high income
agents tend to have higher asset income, the second reform has the (potential) advantage
that the beneciaries of the reform pay the costs.
4.1. Long Run. This section analyzes the long run welfare implications of two tax re-
forms. The steady state results are displayed in Table 3.
Table 3: Steady state results for the linear and progressive reforms
5Using alternative dentions of labor income based upon W2 forms and total household income, we ob-
tained very similar results.
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Reform ({0;{1;{2) K L r% r% w ceq% (1)
Benchmark (0:25; 0:76; 1:37) 6:11 0:46 1:72 2:87 2:55 100 -0.656
Linear (0:34; 0:76; 1:37) 6:00 0:44 2:72 2:72 2:57 99:38 -0.673
Progressive (0:46; 1:53; 1:37) 5:20 0:42 3:40 3:40 2:48 106:43 -0.575
The rst row of the table displays the results for the benchmark economy and the last
two rows display the results for the linear and the progressive reforms respectively. Further,
the di¤erent columns of the table display the labor tax function parameters ({0;{1;{2),
the aggregate capital K and labor L, the saving and borrowing interest rates (r ; r), where
r = r (1  k), the aggregate wage rate w, the (relative) aggregate welfare in consumption
equivalent terms ceq, and the e¤ective borrowing limit faced by the lowest income group
(1). Note that this is the most relevant borrowing limit, since it is the one faced by the
lowest two income groups, who are the ones that are typically constrained. Further, in the
stationary equilibrium of this model, this level of debt turns out to be the lower bound of
the stationary distribution of assets.
As expected, the two reforms lead to a lower aggregate labor, reecting the individual
labor supply responses to the increasing labor income taxes. However, we observe that
aggregate capital also decreases in the two reforms in spite of the increase in the after tax
savings interest rate r . Note that the main reason for the reduction in aggregate savings
after the tax changes is that both tax reforms reduce the net total income of the high
income agents, who are the predominant savers in the economy. As we see, the increased
after tax return on asset accumulation does not o¤set this e¤ect. In addition, the e¤ect is
much stronger in the progressive reform, since the reduction in net income for high income
individuals is considerably higher in this case. To illustrate this, we have depicted the e¤ects
of the two reforms on labor income taxes for di¤erent levels of income.
Figure 3: E¤ects of the Linear and Progressive Reforms on Labor Taxes
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The left panel of the gure depicts the e¤ect on labor taxes as a proportion of income
(T l(y)=y) of the linear and progressive tax reforms for di¤erent levels of labor income, while
the right panel of the gure depicts the same e¤ects on labor taxes T l(y). On the one hand,
the linear reform leads to higher labor income taxes for all income levels. On the other hand,
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the progressive reform clearly shifts the tax burden from the income poor to the income rich
by decreasing (slightly) the labor taxes for the former and increasing them for the latter. As
we have seen, these e¤ects on labor taxes reduce the net income of the rich and lead to lower
aggregate savings, especially in the progressive reform.
Table 3 also reects that eliminating capital income taxes considerably improves aggre-
gate welfare when the progressive reform is implemented, while aggregate welfare decreases
slightly with the linear reform. We can get some insight about these welfare changes by
comparing factor prices and borrowing limits before and after the reform.
Consider rst the progressive reform. The after tax savings interest rate r increases
considerably after the reform. This benets the savers and in particular the asset rich, for
whom capital income is relatively more important. Second, the increase in progressivity
benets the relatively poor, who rely mostly on labor income and for whom the tax burden
decreases after the reform. Overall, these positive e¤ects o¤set the negative e¤ect of a higher
borrowing rate for the asset poor and of higher average labor income taxes for everyone (but
the very poor) due to the increase in {0. Finally, the higher borrowing rate makes default
more attractive and this leads to a tighter borrowing limit in the long run. In turn, this
implies that the poorest households in the new steady state are richer than in the original
one. This also contributes to a higher long run aggregate welfare. Note, however, that
these last e¤ect also shows that it is not appropriate to draw welfare calculations based
upon comparing only steady states. Tighter borrowing limits may hurt agents in short run
signicantly as they limit consumption smoothing and this may decrease their welfare. The
strength of the latter e¤ect will depend on how the borrowing constraints change during the
course of the transition to the new steady state and we will investigate on this later on.
Consider now the linear reform. First, while the reform leads to an increase in the after
tax savings interest rate r and to a decrease in the borrowing rate r, these positive e¤ects
are o¤set by the fact that labor income taxes become higher for everyone. In addition
to this, the table reects that the borrowing limits become looser after the linear reform
is implemented. The reason is that a decrease in the borrowing rate makes default less
desirable. While looser limits might benet borrowers in the short run, this results in the
poorest agents being more indebted and therefore poorer in the new steady state, which
again contributes to a lower aggregate welfare. However, looser limits (in principle) allow
for more consumption smoothing and this e¤ect can only be measured by studying explicitly
the transition between the steady states.
Before doing that, we would like to emphasize one important aspect of these reforms.
As suggested by the analysis of Davila et.al (2007), we expected to have welfare gains of
eliminating capital income taxes. The reason is that this leads in general to a higher capital,
which in turn increases the wage income of the low income and low asset agents, who primarily
rely on labor income. However, this does not happen in our economy. As we see, the
progressive reform is welfare enhancing but this is not due to a higher aggregate capital,
which is reduced by about 15 percent, but because of a lower wealth inequality. To see this,
Table 4 presents the wealth distribution in the new steady states and the number of people
in debt for the two reforms. As we see, wealth inequality is lower in the two reforms but the
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reduction is higher in the progressive reform. This is due to di¤erent reasons. Agents with
low income and/or assets face higher (after tax) saving interest rates. Hence, they are able to
save more. This is also reected by the fact that a smaller fraction of agents ends up in debt.
At the same time, high income agents are taxed more. Hence, they are able to save less.
Overall, wealth becomes less concentrated both because the elimination of capital income
taxes allows the poor to save more and because the accompanying rise in progressivity limits
the savings of the rich.
Table 4:Wealth Distribution Before and After the Tax Reforms
Quintiles In debt
Reform Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 %
Benchmark -1.56 0.68 2.65 7.86 90.35 22.92
Linear -1.61 0.77 2.91 9.06 88.85 22.77
Progressive -1.30 1.68 4.38 10.54 84.68 18.20
As explained earlier, the previous analysis does not provide with a nal answer regarding
the desirability of the tax reforms we consider due to the fact that we do not take into
account the transition towards the new steady state. As pointed out above, the tightness
of the borrowing limits can a¤ect the degree of risk sharing in the short run and this could
potentially o¤set (at least partially) the long run e¤ects. To evaluate this, we have also
computed the welfare changes when we take into account the transition and we discuss this
next.
4.2. Transition. In what follows, we analyze the transitional e¤ects of eliminating capi-
tal income taxes. This will help us evaluate if the long run welfare implications are o¤set by
the short term e¤ects along the transition. As explained earlier, the endogenous borrowing
limits get looser in the linear reform and this could lead to more consumption smoothing
and to a higher overall welfare. In contrast, the fact that borrowing limits get tighter in
the progressive reform could lower aggregate welfare in the short run. In addition to this,
studying the transition will allow us to analyze whether any of the two reforms could gain
political (majority) support. At the same time, we will also be able to identify who are the
winners and losers of each reform.
Note that an important di¤erence between our framework and a xed limit economy is
that the endogenous borrowing limits are a¤ected by the tax reform, since a change in tax
policy inuences the relative value of default. To disentangle the e¤ect on the limits from
the rest, we have also solved for the interim cases in which the reforms are implemented but
the borrowing limits are kept the same as in the pre-reform economy. This exercise can also
answer the question of what we would conclude about the welfare e¤ects of the tax reform
if we had ignored the e¤ect of the reform on the endogenous borrowing constraints.
The transitional path for some of the key aggregate variables is displayed in Figure 4 (the
dashed lines refer to the progressive while the solid lines refer to the linear reform). Several
important observations emerge from the picture. First, we see that the aggregate production
factors behave relatively similar in the two reforms. Second whereas capital decreases
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gradually towards the new value in the two reforms, labor supply drops instantaneously
when the reform hits. Since more progressive taxes distort labor supply more, the drop is
more dramatic in the progressive reform. In this case, wages drop in the long run but they
rise at impact due to the fact that labor becomes more scarce and capital is still relatively
high. Similarly, the borrowing interest rate rises in the long run but it drops at impact.
Third, since capital and labor are much more stable in the linear reform, the short and long
run behavior of factor prices in that case is relatively similar. Finally, the last panel reects
that the average tax parameter {0 does not have to adjust much during the transition. This
is the case especially in the linear reform, where capital and labor, hence wages experience
a relatively small change.
Figure 4: Transition Path for the Aggregates in the Linear and Progressive Reforms
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The movement of factor prices described above is key for understanding the time path
of the e¤ective borrowing limits (1) (it turns out that the lower bound of the stationary
distribution is also given by (1) along the transition). Figure 5 depicts these limits in
the two reforms. The dashed line refers to the original borrowing limit while the solid line
depicts the time path of the limits throughout the transition.
As we see, the time patterns are consistent with the path of factor prices and in particular
with the one of the borrowing interest rate. In the linear reform, this rate drops at impact
and it increases slightly during the transition. The borrowing limit follows the same pattern
as (ceteris paribus) this determines the relative value of default compared to paying back (or
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rolling over) debt. Note also that looser limits are expected to be benecial for the borrowing
constrained agents, as they increase consumption smoothing. In the progressive reform,
although the limits get considerably tighter in the long run, this happens very gradually.
Moreover, the limits get somewhat looser at impact because the borrowing interest rate
drops and this makes default less attractive. Hence, when the reform is implemented, agents
are actually able to smooth consumption better. Nevertheless, they also know that they
will face a slowly tightening path of borrowing constraints that will limit their future ability
to smooth consumption. In other words, contrary to the arguments made in the previous
subsection, this reform does not seem to limit the consumption smoothing capabilities of the
constrained agents.
Figure 5: Borrowing Limits in the Linear and Progressive Reforms
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Figure 6 displays the welfare gains due to the reforms in consumption equivalent terms
for individuals with di¤erent income shocks and asset levels. The upper panel of the gure
reects the welfare gains after the linear reform and the lower panel displays the gains after
the progressive reform.
This gure is important for two reasons. It shows who are the agents who would be
in favour and against the reform. Also, it indicates whether this reform could have public
support or not. The answer to the rst question is the following. For agents with positive
asset position, the higher is the asset wealth of a given individual, the more this agent prefers
the reform. This is not surprising, as agents with a higher asset wealth benet more from
the increase of the savings interest rate. In addition, we see that, for most asset levels,
the higher is the labor income of a given individual, the less this individual will favour the
reform. This is because the increased progressivity in labor income taxes will hurt this agent
the most. In general, these results imply that low income individuals will tend to be in favour
of the reforms, while high income individuals will tend to be against it. We also see that
for low income households, the welfare gains are not monotone. In particular, we observe
higher welfare gains with higher levels of debt. The reason is twofold. First, borrowing rates
decrease at impact in the two reforms and this instantaneously reduces the interest burden
of debt. Second, borrowing limits get looser at impact, implying that households who are
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borrowing constrained can borrow more (note that this is only for a few periods in the case
of the progressive reform).
Whereas the previous discussion illustrates that there are important similarities between
the two reforms regarding individual welfare gains, the previous graph reects important
di¤erences. Whereas the two lowest income groups support the progressive reform regardless
of their asset levels, agents in these income groups with relatively low asset holdings or low
debt do not support the linear reform. Moreover, since these agent groups constitute a
relatively high proportion of the population, this results in 95% of the population supporting
the progressive reform, while only 28% support the linear reform. To help explain this, note
that relatively poor agents in the progressive reform end up saving and consuming more
due to the lower tax burden. In other words, the progressive reform is welfare-enhancing
because it reduces consumption and wealth inequality, not because it increases output. In
contrast, relatively poor agents, in principle, would like to save more but have to reduce
their consumption due to their increased tax burden when the linear reform is implemented.
This is particularly important for poor agents and it helps explain the di¤erences between
the two reforms.
Figure 6: Welfare Gains after the Linear and Progressive Reforms
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At this point, it becomes clear that we should expect that the aggregate welfare results
obtained by comparing steady states do not change qualitatively if we take into account
the transition. This is conrmed by Figure 7, which depicts the aggregate welfare losses for
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the two reforms in consumption equivalent terms. To asses the importance of the fact that
borrowing limits are endogenous, the gure also depicts the welfare changes when the limits
are kept at their pre-reform level (interim reforms).
Figure 7: Aggregate Welfare Losses in the Linear and Progressive Reforms
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As reected by the gure, both the quantitative and qualitative ndings regarding the
long run aggregate welfare changes are practically unchanged when the transition is taken
into account. The linear reform implies a 0.8% welfare loss, while the progressive reform
leads to a welfare gain of around 5.9%. We also see that the time path of aggregate welfare
is non-monotone in both cases. To explain this, note that the fact that the limits get looser
at impact leads to more consumption smoothing and to a higher welfare around the limit.
Moreover, as some agents have bad draws of the income shocks and the limits get tighter,
aggregate welfare starts dropping.
As stated earlier, Figure 7 also plots the time pattern of aggregate welfare for the interim
reforms. Several observations are worth noting. First, we see that our qualitative ndings do
not change if we ignore the e¤ect on the limits. In the linear reform, however, we see that the
immediate welfare losses due to the reform would have been more severe if the limits did not
adjust to the policy change. Similarly, the welfare gains from the progressive reforms would
have been exaggerated if the e¤ect of the limits was not taken into account. This may sound
counter-intuitive as the limits get looser at impact in this case (see Figure 5). However, recall
that agents are forward-looking and take into account that the limits are getting signicantly
tighter over time in this case. Otherwise, the immediate aggregate welfare gains would be
higher.
To analyze the political support, Figure 8 depicts the welfare gains in consumption equiv-
alent terms for di¤erent income groups and asset levels for the full and the interim linear
reforms. As mentioned above, the impact of the change in the borrowing limits is particularly
important for the relatively poor agents with negative assets, since these are the ones who
are typically constrained. In particular, we see that the interim reform leads to a welfare loss
for these agents, while welfare is higher for the same income groups if the limits are allowed
to adjust. In fact, the political support in the interim reform is of 21% versus the support
of 28% if we allow the limits to adjust.
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Figure 8: Welfare Gains in the Linear Interim Reform
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Finally, we nd that the political support is almost unchanged when we compare the
interim and the full progressive reforms, since the borrowing limits hardly change at impact.
Note, however, that to obtain this result it is very important that the limits adjust gradually
to the tighter level. In fact, if the limit was adjusting fully at impact, the reform would have
very negative welfare consequences. In this case, agents would have a low consumption due
to the fact that their next period debt would have to be considerably lower than the present
one or otherwise they would have to default during the transition.
5. Conclusions
The present work studies whether eliminating capital taxes is desirable or not in an economy
with incomplete markets, capital accumulation and the possibility of default on nancial
liabilities. In particular, we study competitive equilibria where the loosest possible limits
that prevent default are imposed.
We rst calibrate the model to match the distribution of nancial assets (and unsecured)
debt in the US economy. Then, we analyze the welfare implications of a revenue neutral tax
reform that eliminates capital income taxes at the expense of higher labor income taxes. Our
benchmark economy has a progressive labor income tax code and we study di¤erent reforms
that increase the average tax rate and/or modify the progressivity of the tax system.
In our setting, we nd that eliminating capital taxes can be welfare enhancing only if it
is accompanied by an increase in the progressivity of the labor income tax system. In this
case, aggregate capital is lower in equilibrium due to the reduction in savings of high income
agents, who are actually against the reform. In contrast, low to middle income households
support the reform, since their disposable income is not reduced as much and they face higher
after tax saving interest rates forever and lower borrowing interest rates in the short run. It
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is important to note that aggregate welfare under this reform is higher both in the long run
and throughout the transition. However, the higher welfare does not arise because of a higher
output but because of a reduction in inequality. In contrast to this, when the progressivity
of the labor income tax code remains unchanged but average taxes are increased, the higher
tax burden for all income groups more than o¤sets the positive e¤ects of the reform and
aggregate welfare decreases both in the long run and the short run.
Finally, we nd that the endogenous borrowing limits respond signicantly to tax changes.
In particular, they become tighter if the labor income tax code is made more progressive,
while the opposite happens when average taxes are increased but the progressivity of the
labor income tax code is left unchanged. While changes in the limits a¤ect consumption
smoothing in the short run, the qualitative long run welfare e¤ects of the two reforms remain
unchanged when the transition is taken into account. However it is important to note that
to obtain this result the limits have to adjust gradually. For example, if the limits become
tighter at impact when the progressive reform is implemented, aggregate welfare would be
dramatically lower.
Our results so far point to, at least, two interesting directions of future research. First,
Davila et. al (2007) have shown that, for our calibration, constrained e¢ ciency would require
a higher aggregate capital stock than the one the competitive equilibrium can achieve. This
implies that capital accumulation has to be subsidized and not taxed on average. We see that
the tax system this paper uses is not exible enough to generate welfare gains by providing
incentives for higher capital accumulation. One remaining question is whether we can nd
a simpletax system which can bring us closer to the constrained e¢ cient benchmark. Our
results indicate that such tax system may have to include transfers, non-linear capital income
taxes/subsidies and consumption taxes. Second, our results show that changes in scal policy
can have important impact on default incentives. This implies that if we were to allow default
in our model in a way similar to Chatterjee et. al. (2007), changes of scal policy would
have important implications on the households default decision and on the total amount of
unsecured debt in the economy.
APPENDIX
Numerical Algorithm
1. Computing the Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
The general algorithm used to solve for the steady state given  k and a vector of pa-
rameters  = ({0;{1) for the labor income tax function T l is an extension of the one in
Aiyagari (1994) to endogenous limits. We use a generalized policy function iteration which
relies on the rst-order conditions (mainly the Euler equation) of the model. Further, we
approximate all the relevant policy and value functions with linear interpolation over a nite
but endogenous grid on assets. To solve the individual problem with policy iterations, we
proceed as follows. Given a set of default thresholds k, an interest rate r, a wage rate w, a
tax  k and a vector , we let h be the vector consisting of the policy functions of interest, i.e.,
h = [c; k0; l]. Let  be a non-linear operator such that [h,W ,V ; k; r; w;{2] satises the indi-
23
vidual optimality conditions given k, where {2 ensures budget balance for the government.
To approximate the xed point, we follow the steps below.
Step 1: Guess an initial vector [h0,W 0; V 0; k0; r0; w0;{02 ], where h0 = [c0; k00; l0].
Step 2: For each iteration n  1, use the previous guess [hn 1;Wn 1,V n 1] and also the
vector [kn 1; rn 1; wn 1;{n 12 ] to compute the new vector [hn;Wn,V n] that satises
the individual equilibrium conditions.
Step 3: Use the value functions [Wn,V n] to nd the new lower bound kn such that
Wn(; kn())  V n(), and update the grid accordingly.
Step 4: Using hn and the distribution for the idiosyncratic shock , calculate 	, the joint
(stationary) distribution of assets and income. Next, use 	 to calculate the supply of
capital, which is compared to the aggregate capital demanded by the rm to get rn.
Step 5: The new parameter {n2 of the labor income tax function is calculated given 	 and
hn to satisfy the governments budget constraint.
Step 6: Repeat Steps 2-5 until convergence.
Note that our setting requires the introduction of some notable di¤erences with respect
to the standard procedure to solve models with uninsurable income shocks.
First, the key rst-order condition is the Euler equation of the agent:
u0c (c; 1  l)  Eu0c
 
c0; 1  l0 (1 + r (1  k)) :
Recall that k > 0 when agents save and k = 0 when agents borrow. In this case,
the agents optimal saving policy may not be continuous (the agents optimal consumption
and value function is continuous nevertheless). We rst check whether there exists a strictly
positive asset level satisfying the Euler equation above with equality and k =  k and
whether there is k0 2 [; 0] satisfying u0 (c; 1  l)  Eu0 (c0; 1  l0) (1 + r). If there is a
solution in the two cases, we choose the one which yields higher life-time utility. Using the
equilibrium policy functions, the value functions W = W (; k) and V = V () are calculated
then recursively. As usual, in the above inequality for c0; we use the consumption policy
functions from the previous guess.
Second, in Step 3, we need to update the endogenous default thresholds k for every level of
income during every iteration. WheneverWn(; kn 1()) > Vn(); we choose kn() < kn 1().
This means that we loosen the limit and this is done proportionally toWn(; kn 1()) V n().
Whenever, Wn(; kn 1()) < V n(), we dene kn() such that Wn(; kn()) = V n(), that is,
we tighten the limit.
Third, in Step 5, we use the parameter {2 to guarantee that the governments budget
constraint is satised with equality period by period. This needs to be done because ag-
gregate capital is endogenous and for any given parameter the revenue of the government
depends on the wage rate, which in turns depends on aggregate capital.
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Fourth, as opposed to the general procedure used to solve these type of economies, in
which case one iterates only on r (or equivalently K); in our procedure we have to iterate
simultaneously on {2; r and on the default thresholds kn(): In principle, this could make
the solution procedure less stable and slower. However, if one rst solves the model with
xed and exogenous limits and then use the solution of such model as the initial guess for
our procedure, then it converges relatively fast and without major problems.
2. Computing the Transition Between Steady States
When we calculate the transition between steady states we need to adjust the above
procedure in the following way. First, for the sake of the exposition assume that convergence
to the new steady state takes place in 
 periods. Second, each period, assume that the
government adjusts the labor income tax parameter {0. Then we follow the steps below.
Step 1: Guess a time series for the variables

h0t ;W
0
t ; V
0
t ; k
0
t ; r
0
t ;{00;t
	

t=1
; together with
the time series for the distribution of individuals

	0t
	

t=1
. We then initialize the rst
period with stationary distribution of the rst steady state (	01 = 	

SS1 and r
0
1 = rSS1)
and we assume that at time T we are already in the second steady state (	0
 = 	

SS2
and r0
 = rSS2)).
Step 2: For each iteration n  1 and for each time period 1  t  
 1, we use the previous
guess for the next period [hn 1t+1 ;W
n 1
t+1 ,V
n 1
t+1 ] and [k
n 1
t+1 ; r
n 1
t+1 ;{
n 1
0;t ] to compute the new
vector [hnt ;W
n
t ,V
n
t ] that satises the individual equilibrium conditions.
Step 3: Further, use the value functions [Wnt ,V
n
t ] to nd the new lower bound k
n for all
2  t  
  1 such that Wnt (; knt ())  V nt (), and update the grid accordingly.
Step 4: Using hn and , we calculate 	nt+1, the joint distribution of assets and income
and then use 	nt+1 to calculate the supply of capital K
n
t+1. These two variables are
compared the initial guesses 	n 1t+1 and K
n 1
t+1 for all 1  t  
  1.
Step 5: The new tax rate on labor for each time period 1  t  
   1 is calculated given
	n 1t and hnt to satisfy the governments budget constraint.
Step 6: Repeat Steps 2-5 until convergence in

kt+1;Kt+1;{0;t
	
 1
t=1
.
This procedure is implemented in two steps. First we apply the procedure without Step
3, assuming that the limits are set for every period by the limits of the second steady state.
This provides a very good rst guess for the time path of aggregate capital, factor prices
and taxes. This part of the procedure is also used to nd 
, the endogenous length of the
transition using an iterative procedure starting from 
 = 3: Then using the solution of this
rst step as the initial guess, we implement the whole procedure, which involves adjusting
the limits for every period.
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